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THE OUTSTANDING DECISIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN 1954
ARCHIE 0. DAWSON*
NE EDLESS to say, any review of Supreme Court opinions for the last
twelve months must be limited to a few important decisions. Space
does not permit a review of all of them. For example, in the calendar
year 1954, the Supreme Court handed down 80 decisions, covering 960
pages of text, and this is exclusive of decisions on the granting or deny-
ing of applications for writs of certiorari or petitions for rehearing. This
review limits itself to a mere touching upon the problems involved, with-
out venturing to discuss at length the reasons given for or against the
decisions either in the majority opinions or in the dissents. For con-
venience, the cases are grouped under appropriate subheadings:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the field of constitutional law, perhaps the most important decision
was Brown v. Board of Education,' by which segregation in the public
school system was declared illegal, thus writing another chapter in the
legal history of segregation that began more than 50 years ago with
Plessy v. Ferguson,2 which set forth the theory in the field of transporta-
tion of separate but equal facilities, a theory that found transferal into
the fields of education, housing, etc. It is interesting to note at this time
that John Marshall Harlan of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, whose grandfather wrote the prophetic dissent in the Plessy case,
has just been confirmed as a new mnember of the Supreme Court. The
decision in the Brown case was not unexpected inasmuch as the Court
had been moving in that direction in other areas.3
SUBvERsIVE ACTIVT S
The year 1954 produced no notable opinions growing out of trials of
communists under the Smith Act4 for advocating the violent overthrow
of the government, such as took place in Dennis v. United States.,
* Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Address Delivered at a Forum of the New York County Lawyers Association, held at its
Home of Law on April 21, 1955.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (housing) ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 US. 629
(1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (higher education);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
4. 18 U.S.CJA. § 2385 (1948).
5. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Also, there were no espionage or treason cases similar to Rosenberg v.
United States.' However, there was an ancillary proceeding that stem-
med from the Dennis case in Sacker v. Association of the Bar of the City
of New York. 7 In that case, Harry Sacher, who had been counsel for
certain defendants, had been held in contempt of court for his conduct
in the course of the trial. As a result thereof, Sacher served six months
for contempt and disbarment proceedings were commenced which re-
sulted in an order permanently disbarring him from practice before the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. A
majority of the Supreme Court found that he had been sufficiently pun-
ished by the jail sentence and set aside the disbarment order. However,
it would appear to one who, as a member of the District Court, is an
interested observer, and who has the day to day job, unlike the Supreme
Court, of keeping in bounds lawyers who overstep the proper limits of
advocacy, that the question was not whether the punishment was too
severe, but whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion.
However, the Supreme Court disagrees, and thereby makes the job of the
District Court judge much more difficult.
The passage of time produced an interesting situation that stemmed
from this reversal for thereafter, in late 1954 and in early 1955, Harvey
Matusow, who had been a witness for the government in certain com-
munist prosecutions, recanted his previous testimony and professed tc
have perjured himself. This produced a proceeding in the United State.,
District Court for the Southern District of New York, which is still con.
tinuing, United States v. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, in which it is soughl
to overturn the convictions of a number of convicted communists and ir
which the same Harry Sacher, now restored to practice in our Court
and now with impeccable court demeanor, cross-examined one of th(
prosecutors, Roy Cohn, in a nimble battle of wits.
ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIP
In the case of Galvan v. Press8 a majority of the Court held that ar
alien who had joined the Communist Party without knowledge of it,
advocacy of violence was deportable. This case reaffirmed the principh
that the power of Congress over the admission of aliens and their righ
to remain is necessarily very broad, inasmuch as it is founded on thf
right of the sovereign to conduct foreign relations and maintain nationa
security, and that, therefore, an alien's liberty is largely at the mercy o
Congress and not protected by ordinary constitutional guaranties.
6. 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
7. 347 U.S. 388 (1954), reversing 206 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1953).
8. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,9 another deportation
proceeding, the Supreme Court remanded the action on the ground that
the denial of an offer of proof that Accardi's application for suspension
of deportation had been prejudged by the Department of Justice, includ-
ing the Board of Immigration Appeals, through the public issuance by
the Attorney General, who appoints that Board, of a list of unsavory
characters that included the petitioner. A majority of the Court held that
the Board of Immigration Appeals must render its decision on the peti-
tion of an alien seeking suspension of a deportation order free from any
dictation of the Attorney General and that, therefore, the alien was en-
titled to a hearing on a habeas corpus petition to show that because the
Attorney General had included his name on a list of unsavory characters
which had previously been circulated among Board employees, it was
impossible for him to secure fair consideration before the Board of Im-
migration Appeals. In an interesting dissent, four justices, led by Mr.
Justice Jackson, said:
"Petitioner admittedly is in this country illegally and does not question his deport-
ability or the validity of the order to deport him....
"Congress vested in the Attorney General, and in him alone, discretion as to
whether to suspend deportation under certain circumstances. We think a refusal to
exercise that discretion is not reviewable on habeas corpus, first, because the nature
of the power and discretion vested in the Attorney General is analogous to the power
of pardon or commutation of a sentence, which we trust no one think is subject
to judicial control; and second, because no legal right exists in petitioner by virtue
of constitution, statute or common law to have a lawful order of deportation sus-
pended. Even if petitioner proves himself eligible for suspension, that gives him no
right to it as a matter of law but merely establishes a condition precedent to exercise
of discretion by the Attorney General . .. "
Upon remand to the District Court, proof was adduced to show that
petitioner had been discriminated against through the publication by
the Attorney General of the list of unsavory characters, but the District
Court, in again denying the writ of habeas corpus, found that there had
been no abuse of discretion by the Board. Upon appeal to the Court of
Appeals,11 Judge Frank, in a lengthy opinion, held that the state of a
man's mind is such that it was impossible on the record to say that the
members of the Board of Immigration Appeals, purely on the basis of a
.judicial directive, could so free their minds from the effect of the At-
torney General's list as to render an impartial and unprejudiced judg-
ment and directed that the writ be issued.
The present status of petitioner's deportation proceeding is an in-
teresting speculation, for it would appear from Judge Frank's opinion
9. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
10. Id. at 269.
11. 219 F. 2d 77 (2d Cir. 1955).
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that petitioner would, under the circumstances, be unable to obtain ar
impartial and unprejudiced decision from the Board of Immigratior
Appeals on his application for suspension of his deportation. This wouk
appear to produce an endless cycle, for petitioner would have the righ
to an administrative decision from the Board, but the Court has decidec
that the Board is incapable of reaching a decision. And so petitione
who admittedly is subject to deportation remains here. Only Lewis Car
roll in his "Alice in Wonderland" could do justice to this situation.
RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
An interesting question in this area was presented in United States V
Harriss,2 where the constitutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lob
bying Act' 3 was upheld with interesting dissents by Mr. Justice Douglas'
and Mr. Justice Jackson. 5 This act, which requires a reporting of fund
solicited, received, or expended for the purpose of lobbying, was at
tacked on the ground that it was so vague as to make it impossible b
determine the scope of its authority. There is no doubt that the statc
within the exercise of its police power, may control the activities of it
citizens so as to limit the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendmen
-freedom to speak, publish, and petition the government. The cases s
holding are far too numerous to enumerate, the latest being Saia %
New York'" and Kovacs v. Cooper.17 The majority, relying upo
the rule of statutory construction that if a general class of offenses ca
be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of th
statute, the Court is under duty to give the statute that constructior
found that the general class of offenses to which the statute was directe
was plainly within its terms, and that even though marginal cases cor
ceivably could arise, the statute was not so vague as to be struck ou
Nor did the Court find that the purposes set forth in the act were s
vague as to make it unconstitutional. In dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglv
commented on the fact that while he was in sympathy with the effor
of the Court to save a statute from the charge that it was so vague an
indefinite as to be unconstitutional, he was forced to conclude that whel
such a statute could easily ensnare people who had done no more tha
exercise their constitutional rights of speech, assembly, and press, it wr
too dangerous for use. He concluded that the acts forbidden were s
vague that men of common intelligence would necessarily have to gue:
12. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
13. 60 Stat. 840-842 (1946), 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 261-270 (Supp. 1954).
14. 347 U.S. at 628.
15. 347 U.S. at 633.
16. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
17. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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at its meaning and that, therefore, it failed to meet the standards re-
quired by due process of law. Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissenting on
similar grounds, concluded that the statute posed a serious infringement
upon the First Amendment, particularly in that it narrowed the activ-
ities of the people in as sensitive an area as their access to Congress. 8
PROCEDURE
McAllister v. United States"9 raised two interesting collateral ques-
tions which, while not part of the holding, were commented upon by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissenting. 0 It would appear that certiorari
was granted in this matter purely to review the sufficiency of the findings
of the District Court in a negligence action under the Suits in Admiralty
Act. 1 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented upon the fact
that the case exposed the urgent need for some type of workmen's com-
pensation legislation covering seamen and also stressed the absence of
sufficient grounds for the granting of certiorari. It would appear from a
reading of the opinion that no question of law of the type normally
contemplated by the Supreme Court when it grants certiorari was
present, but rather only an interpretation of facts bearing on the issue
of causation. The technique of the writ of certiorari had its inception
because of recognition that the Supreme Court should not be resorted
to except in instances that posed serious legal policy questions. It would
appear that sympathy for a ward of the admiralty presented in a dif-
ficult case has set an unnecessary and burdensome precedent involving
the scope of review by the Supreme Court.
ADNismATivE LAW
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v.
Boyd 2 the Court concluded that the absence of finality of administra-
tive action precluded review of the agency stand. In that case, plaintiff
was a union whose members worked during the spring, winter, and fall
on the west coast of continental United States and during the summer
in Alaska under collective bargaining agreements. The question arose
under the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952,2-3 which provided that
all aliens seeking admission to the continental United States from
Alaska, even those previously accepted as permanent United States
18. 347 US. at 635.
19. 348 US. 19 (1954).
20. 348 U.S. at 23.
21. 41 Stat. 525, 46 US.CA. §§ 741-752 (1920).
22. 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
23. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1503.
1955]
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residents, shall be examined as if entering from a foreign country with a
view to excluding them on any one of the general grounds applicable to
aliens generally.24 This requirement created an acute problem for the
union and its members, many of whom were lawful alien residents. The
union contended that Congress did not intend to require alien workers
to forfeit their right to live in this country because they went to Alaska
to engage in lawful work under a lawfully authorized collective bargain-
ing contract. The defendant Immigration & Naturalization Service an-
nounced that the union's interpretation was wrong and that workers
going to Alaska would be subject to examination and exclusion. The
union then commenced an action to enjoin the defendant from so con-
struing the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 and sought declara.
tory relief to the same effect. The Court said, through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter: "Appellants in effect asked the District Court to rule thai
a statute the sanctions of which had not been set in motion against in.
dividuals on whose behalf relief was sought, because an occasion foi
doing so had not arisen, would not be applied to them if in the futur(
such a contingency should arise.12 This, he said, is not a lawsuit t(
enforce or determine a right; it is an endeavor to obtain the assurance oJ
the Court that a statute does not govern hypothetical situations that ma3
or may not make the challenged statute applicable. The determinatior
of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its im
mediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too re
mote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicia
function.
The inflexibility of the Court's position with respect to "finality" i
harsh for the result of the ruling requires a worker to risk deportatiol
in the course of his right to work in order to determine the illegality o
the provision in question.
COMMUNICATIONS
In F.C.C. v. American Broadcasting Co. 20 the Court, in a unanimou
opinion, held that give-away programs were not within the crimina
statute prohibiting the broadcasting of any lottery, gift enterprise, o
similar scheme offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, 2 and tha
the F.C.C. rules attempting to prohibit such programs by licensing wer
invalid. At issue was the validity of an F.C.C. order adopting certaii
interpretive rules in relation to radio and television give-away program,
It would appear at first glance that the Court would have been corn
24. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d) (7) (Supp. 1954).
25. 347 U.S. at 223-224.
26. 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (1948).
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pelled to uphold the F.C.C. rulings under the doctrine of Gray v. Pow-
ell,' which limits the scope of review to that available in the case of
findings of fact and concludes that administrative action must be upheld
if it is reasonable. In the present situation, the Court found that the
F.C.C. authority to enforce the criminal prohibition was limited by the
scope of the statute, and since the programs in question were not il-
legal under the statute, the Commission could not employ the statute
to make them so by agency action. One may therefore conclude that in
this case the Court was not reviewing the reasonableness of the F.C.C.'s
action but the correctness of statutory interpretation in a situation
where an adverse interpretation would collaterally make a non-criminal
act criminal.
LABOR LAW
In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB20 the Supreme Court, with two
dissents, held that the Taft-Hartley Act 0 did not eliminate the doctrine
of Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 31 under which an administrative
finding can be based upon a reasonable presumption or inference drawn
from the facts, even though such finding is not supported by affirmative
evidence in the record. The issue in the Radio Officers' Union case in-
volved orders of the NLRB enforcing the provision of the act making
it an unfair labor practice for a union to encourage or discourage union
membership by means of discrimination. It was contended that the
Board's orders should not have been enforced by the Courts because the
record did not include independent proof that encouragement of union
membership actually occurred. The Board argued on the theory of the
Republic Aviation Corp. case that actual encouragement need not be
proved, but that a tendency to encourage was sufficient, and such tend-
ency was sufficiently established if its existence could reasonably be in-
ferred from the character of the discrimination. The majority of the
Court accepted this argument.
PUBLic ToRT Lm =a.r
United States v. Gilmane construed the right of the United States
Government under the Federal Tort Claims Acte to indemnification
from one of its employees after it had been held liable under the act
for the negligence of the employee. In the unanimous opinion, the
28. 314 US. 402 (1941).
29. 347 US. 17 (1954).
30. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166.
31. 324 US. 793 (1945).
32. 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
33. 28 US.C.A. §§ 1346 (Supp. 1954), 2671-26S0.
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Court held that the government had no right of indemnity against an
employee whose negligence had made it liable for damages. The Court
said that while a private employer clearly has a common law right of
indemnity, to apply the common law here would involve grave con-
sequences upon the relations between the United States and employees.
It would appear that the Court felt that if evils were to flow from this
situation, it was the duty of Congress to act.
CRIMINAL LAW
One of the important decisions in the field of criminal law was that
of Leyra v. Denno.34 In this case, the defendant was indicted on a charge
of having murdered his parents with a hammer. Thereafter, and largely
by reason of certain alleged confessions, he was convicted and sentenced
to death. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, 85 holding that
one of the confessions made to a state-employed psychiatrist had been
extorted by coercion and promises of leniency in violation of state law,
the state's due process clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
Leyra was retried. Although the state did not again use the in-
validated confession, it did re-use three other confessions. These had
been made by Leyra within three hours after the invalidated confession,
first to a police officer, then to a friend, and finally to two state prosecu-
tors. The trial judge submitted the question of voluntariness of these
confessions to the jury. Conviction followed and the death sentence
was imposed. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.3
An application was made to the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.81
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court charging that the confessions used
against him had been coerced, depriving him of due process of law. The
District Court gave consideration to the petition and denied it. 8 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial."' The pe-
titioner then applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, which this time was granted.40 The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the ground that the use of the confessions in the manner
34. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
35. 302 N.Y. 353, 48 N.E. 2d 553 (1951).
36. 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E. 2d 673 (1952).
37. 345 U.S. 918 (1953).
38. 113 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
39. 208 F. 2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953).
40. 347 U.S. 926 (1954).
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set forth was not consistent with the due process of law required by
the Constitution.
You will notice that the Supreme Court had first denied a writ of
certiorari when the matter came up on a petition to review the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals. But when the United States District
Court and the Court of Appeals refused to overturn the decision of the
New York State courts and the matter was presented on an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court then did grant a writ
of certiorari and reversed. The effect of this decision is to give certain
lawyers the feeling that a defendant convicted in the state courts is en-
titled to two runs for his money. It is well illustrated by the case of the
Readers Digest killers, 1 which completed its third round through
the courts. Their conviction was sustained all the way through
the state courts.' On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed.4V 3
Defendants then instituted a new proceeding, by a petition for a writ
of coram nobis, to raise a point which had been thoroughly argued and
decided in the state courts and which the Supreme Court had refused
to review by affirming. This had to be considered by a judge in the
County Court who denied the writ. It was thereafter argued in the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment." The Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 45
Defendants then proceeded to institute a new proceeding in the United
States District Court by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising a
point which had been presented in the petition for a writ of coram nobis,
a point which had been thoroughly argued and decided in the state courts
and which the Supreme Court had refused to review by denying the writ
of certiorari. The point raised in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
then had to be considered by a judge in the District Court. He denied
the writ.46 It was thereafter argued in the Court of Appeals which sus-
tained the District Court.47 An application for a writ of certiorari was
then filed in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari
on June 6, 1955.
If there is anything which is going to bring discredit upon the ad-
ministration of the criminal law, it is this type of procedure which in-
volves interminable delays. Of course, the United States Supreme Court
has taken the position that a denial of a writ of certiorari is not neces-
41. People v. Cooper, 303 N.Y. 856, 104 N.E. 2d 917 (1952).
42. People v. Cooper, 303 N.Y. 982, 106 N.E. 2d 63 (1952).
43. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
44. People v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 120 N.E. 2d 813 (1954).
45. Cooper v. New York, 348 U.S. 878 (1954).
46. Cooper v. Denno, 129 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
47. U.S. ex rel. Cooper v. Denno - F. 2d - (2d Cir. 1955).
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sarily a determination by it of the issues of the case. Justification of
this position may be apparent, but it is hard to convince the average lay-
man that criminal justice is proceeding with expedition when, as in the
case of the Readers Digest murders, five years have elapsed since the
date of the crime, and they are still having court arguments on matters
which had been presented once before for determination and where the
original petition for certiorari was denied. A bill is in Congress sup-
ported by the Attorneys General of the various states to put appropriate
limitation on this type of proceeding.
Irvine v. Californi 48 further jacketed application of the prohibitions
of the Fifth Amendment to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In that case, the Court split 5-4 in holding that the admission of evidence
obtained by illegal entries into Qne's home in a criminal action in the
state court was not so abhorrent as to require reversal of the conviction
on the ground that the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment were violated. Plaintiff had been convicted of book-
making and related offenses under the anti-gambling laws of California.
Substantially all of the evidence introduced against him had been ob-
tained through invasion of the privacy of his home in his absence. Police
officers had obtained a duplicate key to his home, entered and re-entered
so as to set up a system of microphones, drilled a hole in the roof of
his home so as to connect these microphones to outside lines, thus en-
abling officers to overhear incriminating statements, and thereafter, with-
out a search warrant, used the key to enter his home and secure evi-
dence. Adhering to the decision in Wolf v. Colorado,4 the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evi-
dence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in a prosecution in f
state court for a state crime. The Court distinguished Rochin v. Cali.
fornia,"0 on the ground that the element of coercion or physical assaull
was lacking in the instant situation. Although condemning the un-
abridged deprivation of a citizen's protection against unreasonable searci
and seizure, the Court reiterated and reaffirmed the decision in the Wolj
case. It stated that the mere fact that an unjustifiable wrong had beer
done should not upset a justifiable conviction, and that the remedy tc
assure that one be secure in his home against unreasonable searches i,
an action under the Criminal Code against the offending law officers
With this in mind, the Court suggested that a copy of the record be sen
to the Attorney General of the United States. Justices Black, Douglas
48. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
49. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
50. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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Frankfurter, and Burton dissented5 on the ground that a violation of
the fundamental rights and privileges guaranteed to an individual by
the Constitution, allowed to stand upon the hypothesis that the one
whose rights were violated could only protest collaterally by the in-
stitution of criminal proceedings, vitiates the very source of strength
of the rights.
In Adams v. Maryland52 the Court held that the immunity granted
by 18 U.S.CA. 3486, which provides that no testimony given by a
witness in Congressional inquiries shall be used as evidence in any
criminal proceeding against him in any court, applies to a proceeding
in a state court. In response to a subpoena, petitioner appeared before a
Senate Investigating Committee and answered questions which tended
to incriminate him. Petitioner did not claim the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Petitioner then was indicted and convicted
in the state court on evidence adduced from the Congressional hearing.P
The Court held that the intent of the statute was clear. No assertion of
privilege was necessary for its provisions to be invoked in any court, be
it state or federal.
STATES' RIGHTS
The tidelands issue cropped up again in Alabama v. Texa.s," where
the Court denied the motions of the states of Alabama and Rhode Island
for leave to file complaints challenging the constitutionality of the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953.I In a per curiani opinion, the Court said
that the power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging
to the United States is vested in Congress without limitation, for it must
be borne in mind that Congress not only has legislative power over the
public domain, but also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein.
This power, said the Court, derives from article 4, section 3, clause 2 of
the Constitution, which says in part:
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United States."
Alabama and Rhode Island contended that resources under the marginal
sea were not property either of the United States or of any state, but that
the paramount rights in the United States decreed by the Court in
United States v. Texas,5" United States v. Louisianay and United States
51. Id. at 139-156.
52. 347 US. 179 (1954).
53. 202 Md. 455, 97 A. 2d 281 (1953).
54. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
55. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1314.
56. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
57. 339 US. 699 (1950).
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v. California,5" arose from the sovereignty of the United States and the
duty to provide for the common defense, rather than from article 4, sec-
tion 3, of the Constitution. They urged that these rights were held in
trust for all of the states as a federal responsibility, and to cede them to
individual states would take away the equal footing among states by ex-
tending state power into the domain of national responsibility. This
argument was accepted by Justices Black and Douglas, who stated in
their dissents that the act's language purports to convey all right, title,
and interest of the United States to ocean areas.5" If valid, the act grants
to states all proprietary rights of ownership, the result of which is that
the favored state can set forth the purposes to which all others, including
states and citizens, may use that part of the ocean or its underlying re-
sources. The dissenters contended that this would raise serious and
difficult questions with respect to the authority of Congress to relinquish
elements of national sovereignty over the ocean. Said Justice Black:
"Ocean waters are the highways of the world" 60 and that the import
of the majority's conclusion may be that the government could deed
away the Atlantic or Pacific or even the Mississippi River. If Justice
Black's contention is correct, it might provide interesting possibilities
for Florida real estate salesmen.
MARITIME LAW
In Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson0 ' the Court again extended the
doctrine of liability without fault under admiralty unseaworthiness
actions. On the strength of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,2 and Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,63 the Court extended the doctrine of liability
without fault to include a situation where a longshoreman employed by
a stevedoring company was injured on board a ship by part of the steve-
doring company's gear. It would appear that this extension of the ship-
owner's traditional obligation so as to not only encompass situation
such as in the Sieracki case where longshoremen are injured by the ship.
owner's gear and equipment but also to include those situations whet(
the injury is produced by the equipment and gear of third party em.
ployers, continues the gradual approach towards absolute liability im.
posed upon the owner for injury received by anyone working on boar(
the ship.
58. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
59. 347 U.S. at 277, 281.
60. Id. at 278.
61. 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
62. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
63. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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PoWEiR OF A STATE TO TAX OUT OF STATE BusiNEss OPERATIONS
In two cases the Supreme Court construed the powers of the respective
states to tax business corporations whose operations touch the state.
In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and
Assessment6" Nebraska levied an apportioned ad valorem tax on the
flight equipment of interstate airlines that landed in the state. Appellant,
a foreign corporation which did not have its principal place of business
or home port in Nebraska, was an interstate air transport carrier whose
aircraft made eighteen stops per day in Nebraska. It challenged the
validity of the tax on the ground that it violated the commerce clause
of the Constitution (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). In upholding the tax,
the Court said that federal regulation of interstate land and water car-
riers under the commerce clause has not been deemed to deny all state
power to tax the property of such carriers, nor does the existent federal
air carrier regulation prevent the Nebraska tax challenged here. Eighteen
stops per day was sufficient contact with Nebraska to sustain the state's
power to levy the tax, and the appellant was not deprived of its property
without due process of law.
In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland' Maryland sought to tax a Delaware
corporation whose only contact with the state was that it made deliveries
of merchandise purchased in Delaware to customers in Maryland. Ap-
pellant was a Delaware department store which only sold directly to
customers at its store in Wilmington, Delaware. It did not take orders
by mail or telephone. Residents of nearby Maryland came to its store
and made purchases, some of which were delivered to them in Maryland
by appellant's own truck. Maryland had an excise tax on the use, stor-
age, or consumption of articles sold by the appellant, and it. required
every vendor to collect and remit the tax to the state. In the course of
making deliveries, Maryland seized appellant's truck and the Supreme
Court of Maryland held it liable for the use tax on all goods sold in the
Delaware store to Maryland residents, however -delivered. The Court
held that the Maryland taxing act as applied to the Delaware store
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.
Const. amend. 14, § 1). It reasoned that a seizure of property by a
state under pretext of taxation where there is no jurisdiction or power
to tax is confiscatory and a denial of due process, for the Delaware
corporation neither by its acts or its dealings had subjected itself to the
taxing power of Maryland. Unlike the Braniff case, the Court held that
there was no definite link nor minimum connection between the state
and the department store. The distinction is reasonable.
64. 347 U.S. 59D (1954).
65. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
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ANTI-TRUST
In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.6" the Court construed the Clay-
ton Act6 7 and the Robinson-Patman Act68 to be broad enough in scope
to cover intrastate transactions by a corporation conducting business
among and between the states. Petitioner in this action was engaged in
the bakery business at Santa Rosa, New Mexico. None of his activities
was interstate in character. Respondent was a corporation in the baking
business at Clovis, New Mexico. It was, however, one of several corpora-
tions having interlocking ownership and management. These corpora-
tions maintained plants at Lubbock and Big Spring, Texas, in addition
to plants at Hobbs, Roswell, and Clovis, New Mexico. All of their
products were marketed under a common name and promoted through
a common advertising program. Petitioner and respondent were in
competition in Santa Rosa, New Mexico. Respondent, in response to an
agreement by the local Santa Rosa merchants to purchase petitioner's
produce exclusively, cut the wholesale price of its bread in Santa Rosa
from 14 cents to 7 cents for a pound loaf and from 21 cents to 11 cents
for a pound and a half loaf. Respondent did not cut its bread prices in
any other town. The price war continued for a period of approximately
8 months and as a result, petitioner was forced out of business. The Dis-
trict Court held for the petitioner, and was reversed by the Court of
Appeals, 9 on the ground that the injury resulting from the price cutting
was to a purely local competitor whose business was in no way related to
interstate commerce, or if competition was lessened or a monopoly
created, it was purely local in scope and effect. In reversing the Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court found that to fall within the provisions
of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act and section 3 of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, it need not be shown that the acts complained of occurred in
interstate commerce, if it could be shown that, as here, the price dis-
crimination consisted of cutting the price of the intrastate sales while
maintaining the price of the interstate sales. The Court based its reason-
ing on the premise that where the beneficiary of the outlawed competi.
tive practices is an interstate industry, even though the act complained
of is purely intrastate, if its effectiveness flows from the fact that the
participant can rely upon its interstate sales or interstate transaction.,
to cushion the losses of local price cutting, it is a violation of the anti.
trust laws. It would appear that this is a sound decision, for to otherwise
construe the anti-trust acts would enable large interstate corporation!
66. 348 US. 115 (1954).
67. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (1936).
68. 49 Stat. 1528, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13A (1936).
69. 208 F. 2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953).
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to absorb the markets of local corporations by effectively destroying
their businesses through price cutting, while absorbing the resulting
deficits through their out of state operations in which they had not cut
the prices.
TAXATION
In four cases: Holland v. United States,"0 Friedberg v. United States,7'
Smith v. United States,"2 and United States v. Calderon,73 the Court
considered the net worth method of proof used by the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue to convict willful evaders of income taxes. This was
not the first time that the Court had occasion to pass upon the
application of the net worth theory, having passed upon the theory
in United States v. Johnson,74 a situation where the taxpayer had
no records. However, subsequent to that time, the Department of Jus-
tice has expanded its use of the net worth theory to encompass almost
all income tax evasion actions and these cases were the first in which the
Supreme Court focused its attention upon the serious doubts of numer-
ous lower courts regarding the implications of the net worth method.
In a typical net worth prosecution, the government, having concluded
that the taxpayer's records are inadequate, as a basis for determining
income tax liability, attempts to establish the total net value of the tax-
payer's assets at the beginning of a given year. It then proves increases
in the taxpayer's net worth for each succeeding year during the period
under examination and calculates the difference between the adjusted
net value of the taxpayer's assets at the beginning and end of each of the
years involved. The taxpayer's non-deductible expenditures, including
living expenses, are added to these increases, and if the resulting figure
for any year is substantially greater than the taxable income reported
by the taxpayer for that year, the government claims the excess repre-
sents unreported taxable income.
In the Holland case petitioners claimed that the government failed to
include in its opening net worth figure $104,000 of currency accumulated
before 1933. The government introduced no direct evidence to dispute
this claim, but relied on the inference that anyone who had $104,000
in cash would not have undergone the hardships and privations shown
to have been endured by petitioners during the 1926-1940 period. The
government also introduced evidence which showed that the defendants
owned a hotel to which they made improvements in the period 1946-
70. 348 US. 121 (1954).
71. 348 US. 142 (1954).
72. 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
73. 348 US. 161 (1954).
74. 319 US. 503 (1943).
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1948 and acquired other assets during that period, all of which were
bought in installments, as if out of earnings rather than accumulated
cash; and that petitioners' income tax returns, as far back as 1913,
showed that their income was insufficient to enable them to save any
appreciable amount of money.
In upholding the use of the net worth theory in this instance, the
Court said that the need for its use in establishing deficiencies in
criminal prosecutions where income is elaborately concealed is so great
that although the scope and latitude allowed prosecutors by the use of
the net worth method is disturbing, it is necessary for the apprehension
of violators. However, the dangers for the innocent that are inherent
in the net worth method of proof require the exercise of great care and
restraint. Trial courts should approach such cases with the realization
that taxpayers may be ensnared in a system which though difficult for
the prosecution to utilize, is equally hard for the defense to refute.
The Court therefore laid down certain ground rules for such prosecu-
tions. It said that charges to the jury should be especially clear and in-
clude, in addition to the formal instructions, a summary of the nature
of the net worth method, the assumption on which it rests, and the in-
ferences available both for and against the accused. This is so because
of the number of necessary inferences required to be drawn in a situa-
tion where the prosecution must always prove the criminal charge be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Where there are no books and records, the jury may infer willfulness
from that fact coupled with proof of an understatement of income; but
when the government uses the net worth method, and the books and
records of the taxpayer appear correct on their face, an inference of
willfulness from net worth increases alone might not be justified es-
pecially where the circumstances surrounding the deficiency are as con-
sistent with innocent mistake as with willful violation.
When the taxpayer offers no relevant explanation of the increases in
his net worth, the government is not required to negate every possible
source of non-taxable income.
Like all other requirements that stem from the benefits received in
a complex society, the utilization of the net worth theory imposes serious
burdens upon the government, the taxpayer, and the Court. However,
the Court would seem to have laid down appropriate checks on the use
of the theory so as to protect a defendant and afford to him that pre-
sumption of innocence which clothes every defendant.
These few decisions which I have discussed mark some of the large
and difficult problems with which the Supreme Court has to wrestle.
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Judge Cardozo, in his wonderful book on "The Paradoxes of Legal
Science", once said:
"The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis
of opposites, these are the great problems of the law." (p. 4)
Nowhere do these great problems become so sharply focused as when
they reach the Supreme Court of the United States. I think that all of
us in this country can be proud that we have in that Court Justices quali-
fied and competent to work out the solutions of these fundamental
problems.
